Since the early 1990s, competition in the Olympic Winter Games has changed notably in terms of events contested and nations taking part. Despite, these changes, which are overseen by the International Olympic Committee (IOC), the number of medal-winning nations has remained relatively stable.
INTRODUCTION
In 1992, the Olympic Winter Games were held in the same year as the Olympic Summer Games for the last time, and marked the start of a period of considerable growth in the former (e.g., Chappelet, 2002 Chappelet, , 2014 Kempf, Weber, Renaud, & Stopper, 2014) . Between the Winter Games of Albertville 1992 and Sochi 2014, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) increased the number of events by 72%, from 57 events to 98 events. Meanwhile, the number of nations taking part in the Olympic Winter Games has increased by 38% from 64 to 88. This increase is limited by the Olympic Charter to 'approximately 100 events', provided that the total number of athletes 'shall not exceed 2,900' (IOC, 2015, p. 87) . As this limit was not reached at the 2014 Sochi Games, it would appear that there is further scope for the IOC to increase the programme even further.
Despite this overall growth in the number of medal-winning opportunities and the number of nations taking part, the actual number of medal winners is largely limited to a small sub-set of competitive nations that dominate the Winter Games (e.g., Andreff & Andreff, 2011; Kempf et al., 2014) . The competitiveness of a nation at the Winter Games is positively correlated with macro-level factors such as GDP per capita, population size, being a (former) communist state, having a winter climate, the number of winter sports resorts, and hosting the Games (e.g., Andreff & Andreff, 2011; Johnson & Ali, 2004 ). At the meso-level, a nation's competitiveness is connected to its national elite sport system and policies (e.g., Bergsgard, Houlihan, Mangset, Nodland, & Rommetvedt, 2007; De Bosscher, Shibli, Westerbeek, & Van Bottenburg, 2015; Digel, Burk, & Fahrner, 2006; Houlihan & Green, 2008 ).
This point is well illustrated in Table 1 , which shows that in the last seven editions of the Winter Games, the highest proportion of nations winning at least one medal has not exceeded one third and the number of medal-winning nations has remained relatively constant at between 24 and 26 since 1998. On the basis of the summary evidence in Table 1 , this paper focuses on disciplines, reflecting the concern expressed by the IOC about the level of meaningful competition between nations 4 at the Winter Games (e.g., IOC, 2002; IOC, 2011 IOC, , 2015 . Since 2002, the IOC's Programme
Commission has reported periodically on the global spread of excellence in each winter discipline, by analysing for example, the number of qualified nations and the number of medalwinning nations per continent within each discipline (IOC, 2012) . It is therefore reasonable to argue that as the Games' governing organisation, the IOC would like to see an exciting sporting event that reflects genuine global competition in the various winter disciplines (e.g., Kempf & Lichtsteiner, 2015) .
The development of managerial research into the outcome of competition at the Games with regard to the IOC's governing policy has received relatively little attention in the literature to date. To the best of our knowledge, only Baimbridge (1998) and Houlihan and Zheng (2013) have discussed the outcome of competition between nations at the Summer Games in relation to the IOC's governing policy as a mechanism to reduce domination by a minority of nations.
Both sets of authors argued that the IOC, with the support of International Federations (IFs), aims to reduce nations' domination by including new sports and disciplines in the Games, and by limiting the maximum number of athletes entering the competition by nation and by discipline. These studies can be linked to the sports economics literature examining the competitive balance between teams competing in a league, in relation to the governing policies applied by the respective league's commission (e.g., Binder & Findlay, 2012; Fort & Quirk, 1995; La Croix & Kawaura, 1999; Lee & Fort, 2005 . In theory, optimised competitive balance creates the conditions for increased spectator and television viewing demand and therefore increases revenues (e.g., Neale, 1964; Rottenberg, 1956) . However, no index 1 commonly employed in sports economics was used to measure domination (e.g., Depken, 1999; Eckard, 2001; Humphreys, 2002; Koning, 2009; Szymanski & Késenne, 2004; Utt & Fort, 2002; Zimbalist, 2002) . Baimbridge (1998) Unlike a single-sport league like football, measuring domination at the Winter Games using economic indices is more complex because it consists of multiple disciplines, disciplinespecific differences regarding the growth of events, and differences in the number of nations taking part and winning medals. The methods used to examine competition per discipline were 1 For a fuller discussion of indices applied in leagues, see Owen (2013) .
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applied from the field of industrial economics. Economists commonly describe the outcome of competition by quantifying the structure of the industry's markets in which the firms are competing (Sutton, 2001; Tirole, 1988) . Thus, the relevant market and respective competitors need to be defined first (e.g., Porter, 2008; Scherer & Ross, 1990) . The market structure analysis includes information on the size of a market, the number of competitors in the market, and their respective performance. Combining this data by applying economic indices allows analysts to measure the resulting level of market domination. The results provide a basis to discuss implications for governance to enhance the efficient functioning of the market. That is, a competitive firm must be able to compete against the dominant firms in the market (e.g., Baumol, Panzar, & Willig, 1986) . In this regard, economists also analysed the market entry and exit of firms to research the height of barriers to enter a specific market (e.g., Porter, 2008; Scherer & Ross, 1990 ).
This paper has three aims: first, to define the relevant markets and competitors in the Winter Games using selected cases to illustrate the point; second, to test different economic instruments as a proxy for examining the outcome of competition over time; and thirdly, to offer some interpretation of the evidence they provide. The economic techniques are applied to six Olympic winter disciplines over the period 1992 (Albertville) to 2014 (Sochi).
By introducing a perspective drawn from industrial economics to competition at the Olympic Winter Games and relating it to the IOC's governing policy, this research makes a novel contribution to the study of competitive balance within elite sport. Furthermore, it introduces the role of the IOC from a governing perspective to the sport management literature.
A DISCIPLINE'S MARKET SIZE
Competition in the Winter Games is determined by the Olympic programme which is based upon disciplines 'played on snow or ice' (IOC, 2015, p. 23) . Within the programme, the IOC distinguishes between sports disciplines and events resulting in a ranking and an award (i.e. medals and diplomas) for top three and top eight places (IOC, 2015) . For example at the 2014 Sochi Games, the alpine skiing discipline consisted of ten events in total, five for men and five for women. These events were: downhill, super-G, giant slalom, slalom and super combination (IOC, 2013a) . In each event, eight diplomas were awarded by the IOC resulting in a total market size of 80 Olympic diplomas in alpine skiing. The competition format of an event differs according to the governing IF, such as the International Skiing Federation (FIS), or the International Biathlon Union (IBU). The format of an event is the specific design of the competition (e.g., Scelles, Desbordes, & Durand, 2011) , which, in this context, includes for 6 example: distance, starting order, heats and rounds, individual start, mass start, pursuit, relay, etc. (e.g., FIS, 2012; IBU, 2012) .
Governing documents of the IOC reveal that competition in each discipline is evaluated separately after the Games, to decide on the future development of the programme (e.g., IOC, 2011 IOC, , 2012 . According to Rule 45 of the Olympic Charter, the IOC Executive Board makes decisions on the programme of events in a discipline, after consulting with the respective IF, no later than 'three years before the Games' (IOC, 2015, p. 87) . It is important to note that the IOC can implement the following three measures to adapt the discipline's programme: (a) inclusion of individual or (b) team/mixed events, and (c) replacement of an existing event. In winter discipline events, a maximum of three or four athletes per nation can take part in individual events depending on the discipline, and in team and mixed events only one team per nation can take part (e.g., FIS, 2012; IBU, 2012) . Thus, the number of diplomas that can be contested by a nation is reduced to a maximum of three or four diplomas in individual events, and just one in a team or mixed event. In the case of alpine skiing at the Sochi Games, the discipline consisted of ten individual events meaning that a maximum of 40 out of 80 diplomas were contestable by any one nation. (FIS, 2012) . After starting places are assigned, NOCs submit a list of athletes to compete in each discipline at the Games (IOC, 2015) . This procedure is detailed and published separately for each discipline prior to the Games in the Rules of Qualification,
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proposed by the IFs and approved by the IOC (e.g., FIS, 2012; IBU, 2012) . This legal basis also 7 includes the Rules of Competition, such as competition format, judging, and competition equipment (IOC, 2015) .
According to Baimbridge (1998) , this IOC policy of limiting entries per nation and supporting the participation of all eligible member NOCs suggests a likely reduction in the number of competing athletes per nation at the Games. By limiting the number of athletes from strong nations, the IOC enhances the balance of the competition between nations (Baimbridge, 1998) . Szymanski (2003) agrees that the IOC influences competition, with the Rules of Qualification limiting the maximum number of athletes that are able to compete per nation.
Analysing the design of a sporting contest, Szymanski (2003) described this entry quota system as a governing instrument by which the IOC handicaps dominant nations, and argued that the restriction of the number of athletes per nation has a 'significant influence on the outcome of competition' (Szymanski, 2003 (Szymanski, , p. 1149 Hence, similar to an industry that consists of different markets (e.g., Chen, 1996) , the Winter Games (i.e. the industry) are comprised of a market for awards in each discipline. In contrast to economic markets, where growth is driven by demand and production, a discipline's market growth is controlled directly by the IOC. Furthermore, the IOC governs the participation of nations at the Games with instruments, such as quotas and the legal basis of competition,
showing some similarities to those applied by market governing organisations to limit the influence of dominant foreign competitors (i.e. import quotas), and to ensure fair competition (i.e. the legal basis of competition) (e.g., Scherer & Ross, 1990; Sutton, 2001 ).
In analysing the literature, the specifics of the market structure in a multi-discipline sporting event like the Olympic Winter Games become evident. They therefore need to be taken into account when analysing the outcome of competition.
STATIC AND DYNAMIC ECONOMIC INDICES OF COMPETITIVE BALANCE
In sports economics, several researchers have used the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 2 , to analyse the competitive balance between teams in a league (e.g., Depken, 1999; Eckard, 2015; Humphreys, 2002; La Croix & Kawaura, 1999; Owen, Ryan, & Weatherston, 2007 (Eckard, 2001, p. 223 ).
In line with this limitation, Buzzacchi, Szymanski, and Valletti (2003) criticised the HHI for being a static index that does not take into account the identity of the teams dominating competition within a sport over time. Table 2 illustrates the relevance of this argument for the current research using a fictional example of the performances of nations in a market for Olympic diplomas. Top eight places equate in most Olympic competitions a place in the final (Borden, 2014) . Since diplomas are less subject to statistical noise in the data set caused by the performance of an individual athlete, and the margins between winning a medal or not are so fine; diplomas are arguably a more inclusive measure of a nation's performance over time (e.g., Johnson & Ali, 2004; Shibli, De Bosscher, & Van Bottenburg, 2013; Storm, Nielsen, & Thomsen, 2016) . Consequently, in this paper, diplomas (i.e. top eight places) are preferred to medals (i.e. top three places) for analysing the development of competitive balance between nations. In Table 2 at time t-1 as well as in t, the dominant diploma-winning nation wins 50%
of the diplomas while the other two nations each win 25%. Hence, comparing the market concentration in t-1, based on the distribution of the shares of diplomas among three nations, there appears to be no difference in concentration relative to t. In reality, a significant variation in the competitive balance is evident. In this example, the variation between t-1 and t includes a change in the most dominant nation (A to B) as well as an instance of market exit (A) and an instance of market entry (D). This change in the competitive balance remains undetected by a static index like the HHI because it does not capture information on the identity of the diploma-winning nations over time.
To address this issue, different authors have proposed the use of a dynamic index that captures information on the identity of competitors when analysing competitive balance in a league over a time series (e.g., Buzzacchi et al., 2003; Mizak, Neral, & Stair, 2007) . The key feature of a dynamic index is that it links performance to a specific team or nation when measuring differences in the competition over time.
De Bosscher, Du Bois and Heyndels (2012) The authors did not state whether a static or dynamic index is more suitable to analyse internationalisation and used them simultaneously.
In summary, static and dynamic indices have been applied previously to analyse competitive balance in sport over time, but we have found no study that has developed the analysis further by investigating market structure.
METHOD
With reference to the extant literature in industrial economics (e.g., Scherer & Ross, 1990; Sutton, 2001) , we propose that: Olympic diplomas and contestable diplomas define market size;
while the number of nations winning diplomas reflects competitive competitors; and, the resulting competitive balance describes the market domination of nations. The respective measures are used as proxies to analyse the various disciplines' market structure and the outcome of competition. From a market governing perspective, the rationale for examining the diplomas' market is that the IOC awards and publishes top eight places with respect to the Rule of Honour in the Olympic Charter (IOC, 2015) , while nations also use top eight rankings as a performance indicator and therefore recognise them as meaningful levels of achievement (e.g., DOSB, 2014; SwissOlympic, 2014; UKSport, 2016) .
This study focuses on six established and diploma-rich Olympic winter disciplines contested between Albertville 1992 and Sochi 2014, namely: alpine skiing, biathlon, cross-country skiing, speed skating, freestyle skiing and short track speed skating. Every discipline is characterised by two key characteristics. First, they were all included on the Winter Games programme no later than 1992; second, they have sample sizes of at least 250 diplomas awarded over the period.
The data on the IOC quota system per discipline were derived from 42 explanatory competition books for each Games available from the online IOC library. Performance data were sourced from the online Podium Performance database managed by Infostrada Sports 3 . A total of 3,177 diplomas, out of 4,614 diplomas awarded in all 15 winter disciplines from 1988 4 -2014, were edited as follows: diplomas won by each nation in male and female individual, team, and mixed events were aggregated for all nations in each discipline analysed at every Games.
Every nation winning a diploma for the first time during the period under review was considered to be a new market entrant, including the independent nations emerging after the fall of the Iron
Curtain. This applies in particular to the 1992 and 1994 Games in the disciplines dominated by former communist states, such as the USSR, Yugoslavia and East Germany (i.e. alpine skiing, biathlon, cross-country skiing and speed skating).
Olympic events, diplomas and contestable diplomas
In this context, market size is determined by the number of Olympic diplomas awarded by the IOC for top eight places in each discipline's events. This is a significant departure from the conventional approach of analysing top three (or medal winning) performances.
The number of contestable diplomas per nation and per Games in a discipline is determined by the event-types (i.e. individual or team/mixed events), and the respective maximum quota (i.e. three/four or one).
The difference between the number of diplomas available and contestable reflects the IOC's approach of limiting dominant nations by reducing the amount of success they are able to achieve. This feature of each discipline is expressed as the percentage of contestable diplomas.
Qualified and diploma-winning nations
In this research, the number of qualified nations reflects the nations capable of qualifying an athlete or team for the Games according to the Rules of Qualification in the respective discipline.
The number of diploma-winning nations represents nations, which possess the required competitiveness to win a diploma at a point in time. The competitive balance among these nations is analysed assuming that dominant nations manage to produce athletes with genuine top eight potential consistently over time. The percentage of diploma-winning nations is used to underpin our analysis (e.g., Baimbridge, 1998) . If the number of diploma-winning nations remains the same while the number of qualified nations increases, the percentage will decrease.
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
The static Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is used as a proxy for domination in a discipline's diploma market over the period under investigation. The index is based on the diploma share per nation in time t for a given discipline and is defined in equation (1) below:
where K(t) is the number of diploma-winning nations in time period t, and pi is the diploma share of the competitor i = 1, .., K at time t. The diploma share is defined as
where Ni(t) is the number of diplomas won by nation i, and N(t) = ∑i Ni(t) is the total number of diplomas awarded in t. By squaring the share scores, equation (1) weights large shares of dominant nations more highly than small shares of peripheral nations.
Since the HHI is sensitive to the number of nations included, the formula (2), proposed by Michie and Oughton (2004) , corrects for such changes over time. In this context, we correct for the number of qualified nations in time Kqal(t) to enhance comparability 5 .
(2) ( ) = (
) * 100
In a perfectly balanced competition, the corrected HHI reaches the value of 100, while a decline of competitive balance is reflected by an increase of the index (Michie & Oughton, 2004 ).
The corrected HHI indicates how strongly the most competitive nations dominate the discipline at a certain point in time.
Market entry and exit indices
Accounting for market entry and exit is an additional technique for analysing market domination discussed in the economics literature (e.g., Porter, 2008; Scherer & Ross, 1990 ).
Market entry (Mentry) is defined in this paper as the number of nations entering the diploma market by winning at least one diploma in time t and which did not win a diploma at the previous edition of the Games, t-1. Market exit (Mexit) is the number of nations exiting the market at t by not winning a diploma but which had won a diploma at t-1. Mentry and Mexit are defined per discipline and time t as shown in equations (3) and (4):
where s(t) is the set of nations winning an Olympic diploma in time t, and Ii(t) takes the value of 1 if nation i won a diploma at time t, and 0 otherwise.
Equations (3) and (4) are sensitive to the identity of the diploma-winning nations. Equations (3) and (4) measure the 'churn' of nations by quantifying the variation in diploma-winning nations between two points in time. In line with Porter (2008) , these indices provide further evidence about the height of the barriers a nation needs to overcome in order to enter a market for any given discipline. In sport, market entry barriers hinder nations from building the 5 For further information on correcting the HHI see also Coulter (1989) .
13 required competitiveness to win a diploma; while dominant nations might specialise further and thereby continue to raise the entry barriers (De Bosscher et al., 2012) .
Przeworski Index
The dynamic Przeworski Index (PI) proposed by Coulter (1989) , who compared the technical properties of the most commonly applied indices, is used in this research to measure domination of a market for diplomas over time. This index analyses market instability and is technically identical to the Hymer and Pashigian Index of market volatility applied by De Bosscher et al.
(2012). The Przeworski Index is used in this paper because it offers a more intuitive interpretation of the evidence on market domination than the Hymer and Pashigian Index. In our application, the PI is based on the share of diplomas won by a nation in two consecutive editions of the Olympic Winter Games. PI at time t for a given discipline is shown in equation (5) as follows:
where K(t) is the total number of nations that won at least one diploma during the Olympic per nation between the consecutive Games of t-1 and t. Equation (5) takes half of the sum of the absolute differences between the diploma shares of all nations at time t and t-1 to avoid double counting of share changes.
In this paper, (5) is applied to analyse the variation in competitive balance over time, thereby allowing us to identify changes in the distribution of market share between nations, relative to the previous Games. The PI is interpreted as follows: the higher the index, the higher the level of variation in competitive balance compared to the previous Games, and vice versa.
RESULTS
The results are presented first on a sport by sport basis, before the key themes are considered more holistically in the discussion and conclusion.
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Alpine Skiing
With reference to alpine skiing in Table 3 , the IOC has kept the number of Olympic events, Olympic diplomas and contestable diplomas constant. The ten events have been kept constant over the period under investigation. Therefore, alpine skiing can be used as a straightforward example to illustrate the interpretation of the indices applied in this paper and the different aspects of performance data that they measure. The increase in the number of nations qualifying to take part has caused the percentage of diploma-winning nations to decrease. The 74 competing nations in 2014 is the highest number found in all disciplines investigated. It is worth noting here that as any one nation can contest 40 out of 80 diplomas (i.e. 50%); is highly unlikely that all 74 nations taking part will win a diploma. In fact, the number of diploma-winning nations, at between 13 and 14 per edition, has been almost constant since 1998. Comparing these numbers indicates a gap in the level of competitiveness of nations qualifying for the Games and those winning an Olympic diploma.
In contrast to the corrected HHI and the PI, the diploma-winning ratio does not use market shares to measure the performances of nations. Hence, this indicator describes the ratio of a discipline's competitive competitors, but is of only limited value when monitoring the competitive balance between genuinely competitive nations in a diploma market.
The corrected HHI index provides information on the distribution of diploma shares between the competitive nations. Finally, the PI analyses changes in the diploma shares of nations compared with the previous Games, and includes information on changes in concentration and entry to and exit from the market. After high instability in 1992 caused by significant market entry (7) and exit (4) of nations, Table 3 shows that the domination of nations remained relatively stable from 1994, with two small peaks in 1998 and 2010. Each peak marks an increase of instability, followed by stabilisation of domination at the next Games. These two peaks mark the beginning and end 
Freestyle Skiing
Since freestyle skiing became an Olympic discipline in 1992, the market size data in Table 4 highlights a significant increase in diplomas due to the inclusion of male and female individual events: aerials (1994), ski cross (2010), and half pipe and slope style skiing (2014). As the IOC aims to achieve parity between male and female individual events, it is not surprising to see the number of events increase by multiples of two and therefore the number of diplomas increase 16 by multiples of eight. These changes resulted in stability in the percentage of contestable diplomas (50% throughout the period). This peak is caused by fluctuations in market shares compared with 1994 (i.e. market instability) due to the market entry of the six nations listed above for 1998. These nations won high levels of market share for new entrants as reflected in the decrease in concentration measured by the corrected HHI.
Speed Skating
Comparing the total number of diplomas available to the contestable diplomas in Table 5 illustrates 
Short Track
Short Track was introduced to the Olympic programme in 1992 consisting of a male and female individual event with a maximum quota of three athletes per nation and male and female team event. Compared with speed skating, the IOC and the ISU have applied stricter quotas in all individual short track events (Table 6 ). Hence, the inclusion of two additional events in both 1994 and 2002 resulted in just six more diplomas available to be contested on each occasion.
In effect, the IOC increased the percentage of contestable diplomas for already dominant nations. Korea and Ukraine respectively, won five of Russia's seven short track diplomas.
Biathlon
The key characteristic of the market structure in biathlon (Table 7) is an important increase in 
Cross-Country Skiing
The case of cross-country skiing (Table 8) 
DISCUSSION
While most studies tend to analyse the Games as one event (e.g., Andreff & Andreff, 2011; Chappelet, 2002 Chappelet, , 2014 Kempf et al., 2014) , in this paper, we quantified the outcome of competition for diplomas between nations in six Olympic winter disciplines.
All disciplines examined, except alpine skiing, show an increase in terms of number of diplomas awarded and the subset of these that are actually contestable. Applying a similar analysis to short track in 2014, the observed change in competitive balance was not the outcome of any governing measure. Referring to Chen (1996) , such a change must therefore have been caused by significant increases in competitiveness amongst the discipline's contestants. In practice, Russia nationalised foreign short track athletes to increase its competitiveness at the expense of rival competitors. Whether this approach will be sustainable As the increase of competitive nations after the fall of the Iron Curtain and Russia's competitiveness at the Sochi Games shows, the development of competitive balance in a discipline is also determined by factors outside the governing control of the IOC. Amongst those outlined in the literature are: the home nation effect which is a unique competitive advantage for nations when hosting the Games (e.g., Balmer, Nevill, & Williams, 2001; Forrest et al., 2016; Shibli, Gratton, & Bingham, 2012) ; and, nations applying successful elite sport policies to increase their competitiveness (e.g., Bergsgard et al., 2007; De Bosscher et al., 2015) .
Given its focus, such an analysis per discipline, although certainly valid, is beyond the scope of this article.
Finally, these findings point to future directions for further research on the impact of governing measures on competitive balance commonly applied in professional leagues (e.g., Binder & Findlay, 2012; Lee & Fort, 2012) , to Olympic disciplines. Since the difficulty of applying economic indices lies mainly in their interpretation (Coulter, 1989) , the distinction 6 Results for medals instead of diplomas are available upon request.
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between analysing the concentration of competitive balance at a point in time and instability over time makes a useful contribution to the literature (e.g., Buzzacchi et al., 2003; Eckard, 2001) . We argue that the latter index indicates the extent to which a discipline's dominant nations can be competed against meaningfully in practice. Economists have reasoned that a monopoly is not inefficient per se, but that an efficient market of any type has to be contestable.
That is, any competitive firm must be able to compete against the dominant firms in the market (e.g., Baumol et al., 1986) . This is relevant when examining the outcome of competition as a distinction should be made between whether a discipline is always dominated by the same nations, or whether dominance changes over time. In line with Scelles, Durand, Bah and Rioult (2011) , as well as Cabaud, Scelles François and Morrow (2016) , the analysis could be extended in the future to examine intra-event competition and the discussion of event-specific governing measures such as: starting order, heats and rounds, etc. (e.g., FIS, 2012; IBU, 2012) . Reflecting further on the contestability of an efficient market (e.g., Baumol et al., 1986) , an analysis of this type might provide new directions for analysing demand by spectators and television viewers related to the measures of contestability demonstrated in this paper.
CONCLUSION
The proposed measures offer decision-makers in the IOC and the IFs an instrument to analyse the peculiar dynamics of the competitive environment in an Olympic discipline more accurately and objectively. This new insight may enable governing measures to be implemented that are based on sound empirical evidence. However, our analysis indicates that the governing measures used thus far are limited and that incidents outside the management control can have a far more material impact on the outcome of competition between nations.
In addition to developing the application of economic indices to the analysis of competition in sport, this paper also introduces context-specific interpretation of the various measures derived from a time series data set.
